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Abstract. This paper explores the extent to which different party systems in Europe 
effectively represent their citizens. We argue that many European countries suffer from 
a “representative deficit”, which occurs when a significant portion of citizens have to 
vote for a political party whose stated views are actually quite different from their own. 
We measure the extent of this deficit in different European countries using data from 
EU Profiler and euandi, two Voting Advice Applications which served millions of users 
during the EP elections in 2009 and 2014 respectively. We find wide variation in the 
extent to which political parties are accurately tuned in to the preferences of their vot-
ers, a variation which is not clearly linked to the number of political parties or the pro-
portionality of the electoral system. We attempt to explain some of this variation, and 
explore the reasons why some party systems offer better representation than others.
Keywords. Elections, voting advice applications, representation.
INTRODUCTION
If it is the case that ideational congruence between representatives and 
the represented is the “central normative problem of democracy” (Rehfeld, 
2009: 214; see also: Bolleyer and Reh, 2012), then the central questions for 
empirical research on the quality of democracy pertain to (a) measuring 
ideational symmetry between representatives and the represented and (b) 
explaining the factors that lead to variation in this symmetry. This paper 
attempts to contribute towards this enterprise by carrying out both tasks in 
relation to EU member states. In particular, our aim is to measure the “rep-
resentative deficit” (i.e. the degree to which the average citizen fails to find 
complete ideational representation) in each member state as well as to iden-
tify the factors that might explain the (sometimes large) differences in repre-
sentative quality between member states. 
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There is a considerable body of literature on idea-
tional symmetry and representation. However, most 
of these works have focused on aggregate-level con-
gruence between party elites and voters on a left-right 
scale (e.g. Dalton et al., 2011; Rohrschneider and White-
field, 2012; Thomassen and Schmitt, 1999). This is a 
weakness: as Dalton (2015: 1) claims, “the structure of 
political competition is becoming more complex, new 
issues are entering the political agenda, and new par-
ties are engaging the voters”. Against this background, 
this paper hence aims to improve on existing efforts by 
going beyond a unidimensional left-right scale towards 
a multidimensional approach. This is made possible by 
reliance on two unique datasets made available by the 
2009 EU Profiler and its follow-up instalment euandi in 
2014, both Voting Advice Applications [hereafter: VAAs] 
designed for use in each member state in the lead up to 
elections for the European Parliament (see: Trechsel and 
Mair, 2011; Garzia et al., 2017). Unlike other data-sets 
which deal with citizens attitudes across Europe, availa-
ble from Eurobaromater or the European Election Study 
for example, these VAAs were designed with the spe-
cific goal of ideationally matching citizens with parties 
on the basis of a large number of policy issues including 
economic as well as socio-cultural aspects of the politi-
cal competition, and have hence yielded a rich data-set 
for measuring the congruence between participating 
users and profiled parties which goes well beyond the 
traditional left-right separation. In this way, they offer a 
unique opportunity to systematically compare deficits in 
different European countries across countries and time. 
We distinguish between two broad sets of variables 
that may affect the quality of representation in a politi-
cal system, that is, those pertaining to the organisation 
of the regime and those relating to the political commu-
nity or civil society. Building on theory that emphasis-
es the importance of the quality of the communicative 
relationship between the regime and citizens (both as 
individuals and collectivised in organisations), we focus 
on those variables relating to the regime that may affect 
the government’s degree of responsiveness to citizens, as 
well as those variables relating to civil society that are 
likely to affect citizens’ ability and willingness to com-
municate with their representatives. 
The next section explains in more detail the rep-
resentative deficit, as well as our understanding of the 
relationship between communication and representa-
tion. On this basis, we attempt to identify those vari-
ables relating to the communicative quality of a regime 
and civil society that are expected to affect the qual-
ity of representation in a democratic system. Following 
this, we outline our data and methods. In the ensuing 
results section, we find descriptive evidence to confirm 
that the quality of representation is indeed in decline 
across Europe, while the representative deficit in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe taken as a whole is significantly 
worse than in Western Europe. Concerning our explana-
tory variables, we find that many of the usual suspects 
relating to the regime do not in fact explain differences 
in the quality of representation between countries (i.e., 
number of parties, electoral size of country, level of 
decentralisation, proportionality of its electoral system, 
etc.). When it comes to those factors regarding civil soci-
ety (i.e., press freedom, voice and accountability, elec-
toral participation) we find significant explanatory pow-
er. The final section concludes with a discussion of the 
results and their potential implications. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Representative Deficit
The sum of policy options and preferences in a pol-
ity which can be used to make representative promises 
can be conceptualised in terms of a multidimensional 
“political space” (see, e.g., Benoit and Laver, 2012). In such 
a political space, each dimension is a single policy issue 
(for example, the extent to which the unemployed should 
be given benefits), with the range of preferences on the 
issue being equivalent to the total range of the dimension 
(in this example, from no benefits at all to very generous 
benefits). Theoretically, every citizen in a polity can be 
located at some point within this political space, and so 
can the political parties which compete to represent them.
As Chantal Mouffe (1999) argues, the whole of soci-
ety can never be represented since the very nature of 
identity formation and choice necessitates exclusionary 
tendencies. What this means in this context is that the 
choice for one policy position is always a choice against 
a whole set of others. Citizens have a wide variety of 
preferences: it is likely that, even in a moderately sized 
polity, political space is effectively full, with every point 
occupied by at least one person. There are, by contrast, 
typically only a few political parties which contest elec-
tions. This makes it inevitable that the great majority of 
citizens cannot find a party whose position in political 
space coincides exactly with their own. There will always 
be, in other words, a mismatch in the extent to which 
the opinions of citizens are represented in their pol-
ity, something which has previously been described as a 
“representative deficit” (Alvarez et al., 2014: 239). How-
ever, public opinion is not distributed evenly through-
out political space, and nor are political parties. Hence 
the extent to which representation is in deficit will vary, 
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relative to the positioning of both parties and the public 
at large. 
Much of the literature on representation is struc-
tured around the study of political parties (Dalton et 
al., 2011; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2012; Thomas-
sen and Schmitt, 1999). However from the perspective 
of parties the problem of representative deficit is theo-
retically complex, because it is a result of the behav-
iour of the party system as a whole, not individuals 
within it. For example, if we assume, following Downs 
(1957), that parties are essentially “vote maximizers”, the 
need to pursue public opinion would push the major-
ity of parties to move towards the centre ground, which 
would leave public opinion on the extremes less and 
less catered for and result in a homogenization of the 
political offer. Hence a party level incentive to improve 
representation would result in an increasing representa-
tive deficit. Furthermore, vote-seeking models of party 
behaviour have been heavily criticised, with examples 
abounding of parties abandoning the centre ground. 
For this reason, our major interest in this paper lies in 
considering factors relating to the system of democracy 
as a whole which might explain not just the behaviour 
of individual parties but their distribution throughout 
political space. 
Representation and Communication: Some Hypotheses
Our particular focus is on the communicative rela-
tionship between citizens within a polity and political 
actors. In many ways deliberative democrats have been 
successful in achieving what Simone Chambers (2012) 
refers to as the aim of moving political science from a 
vote-based to a talk-based agenda. Certainly, regardless 
of whether or not one subscribes to one or other theory 
of deliberative democracy, the crucial role of discursive 
engagement between representatives and the represented 
in promoting good democratic representation cannot 
be ignored. To put it in James Bohman’s words (2010), 
the goal of democracy is to turn citizens’ communica-
tive freedom into communicative power. That is to say, 
to the extent that citizens are endowed with the basic 
needs and liberties required to organise and participate 
politically (communicative freedom), they should be ide-
ally able to translate the many discourses that go on in 
their associations into a wider discussion with their rep-
resentatives who, in carrying out their law-making func-
tions, are responsive to the discursive force behind these 
exchanges (communicative power). This account need not 
be at odds with the fact that democracy is essentially a 
competitive system that, while requiring compromise, is 
not necessarily geared towards deliberative consensus. 
The key question then is under what conditions is citi-
zens’ communicative freedom likely to be translated into 
communicative power? Understanding the problematic 
thusly, we must analyse those factors which are likely 
to most affect (a) the responsiveness of representatives 
to the discourse of citizens and their organisations and 
(b) the extent to which citizens are willing and able to 
express their communicative freedom. 
Surveying standard accounts of democracy, it is pos-
sible to highlight a range of variables that are expected 
to have an impact on either of the above dependent vari-
ables. Concerning those factors expected to affect the 
responsiveness of representatives, we highlight (i) the 
electoral system, (ii) the number of parties, (iii) the size 
of the country, (iv) the level of decentralisation, and (v) 
the length of time a country has been democratic. Brief-
ly, we can explain the rationale behind the choice of 
these independent variables. 
For the first independent variable, we expect that 
Proportional Representation, rather than First-Past-The-
Post electoral systems, will give rise to better represen-
tation (for an elaboration see: Gerring and Thacker, 
2008: 13-14; 48-57). The winner takes all nature of the 
latter can be seen as incentivising party drift towards 
the median voter, whereas the more even distribution 
of parliamentary seats for which the former system is 
designed provides an incentive for at least some parties 
to rely on voters from their ideological support base. 
This helps to ensure that the values and interests of non-
median voters do not get left behind in public discourse. 
Closely related to this variable is the number of par-
ties in a political system. Quite simply, when there is a 
greater partisan offer, one can expect that citizens will 
have more opportunities to find a better electoral fit and 
thereby reduce their representative deficit (Bright et al., 
2016). 
The size of the country and the level of decentralisa-
tion are variables that are closely related to one another. 
From Montesquieu (1989 [1750]) to Robert Dahl (1989), 
the size of the polity has been taken to have a major 
impact on the quality of representation. The more voic-
es there are per representative, the less likely it is that 
these representatives will be successful in being able to 
reconcile the diverging values and interests of those she 
represents. One can therefore expect that smaller coun-
tries and countries that are highly decentralised, so that 
decisions are taken as close as possible to citizens on the 
local or sub-federal level such that only the remainder is 
left to national representatives, will have a better quality 
of representation. 
Democracy is more than just free and fair elec-
tions, but a political culture and set of norms support-
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ing strong communicative relationships between repre-
sentatives and the represented. However, a democratic 
political culture does not emerge overnight and is often 
haunted by some of the non-democratic habits charac-
terising the previous regime. Therefore we may expect 
that the longer a democratic regime is in place the more 
likely it is that the political culture will have taken on 
the appropriate habits for establishing a good standard 
of representation. 
When it comes to citizens’ willingness and ability to 
express their communicative freedom, we identify sever-
al independent variables that are expected to be signifi-
cant: (vi) freedom of the press; (vii) voice and account-
ability; and (viii) political participation. The quality of 
these democratic features is not easy to measure and 
often have multiple components. In recent years, howev-
er, data sets have emerged with relatively reliable meas-
ures and we draw on these. 
Regarding the first of these variables, freedom of the 
press is widely recognised to be an essential condition 
for democracy. The press is the primary forum in which 
competitive politics is mediated. It serves as a crucial 
discursive conveyer belt between representatives and the 
represented (Habermas, 1996). Significant restrictions 
on media freedom would interfere with this mechanism, 
excluding a wide range of views at the expense of a more 
circumscribed set, ultimately undermining the commu-
nicative relationship between citizens and representa-
tives. In order to measure the variable of press freedom, 
we draw on data from the World Press Freedom Index, a 
data set based on an assessment of press freedom with-
in countries across the world from a range of actors, 
including journalists, academics and activists (Becker et 
al., 2007). 
Voice and Accountability is a category of indica-
tors within the wider World Bank Governance Indica-
tors project – a data-set measuring the extent to which 
citizens can effectively express their views and to which 
public officials can be publically held to account (Kauf-
mann et al., 2009). This dataset is also compiled from 
assessments by civil society actors and the like. Effec-
tively, the less citizens can be seen as capable of rais-
ing their voice and the less reason politicians have to 
fear accountability mechanisms, the less likely it is that 
there will be communicative conditions that are favour-
able to the quality of representation. A further indicator 
we take in this regard is the level of turnout in elections. 
Higher turnout can be expected to impact positively on 
the representative deficit since the more citizens who are 
engaged in the electoral process across the society, the 
more likely it is that representatives will be incentivised 
to take a wide range of preferences into account. 
A final (control) variable we consider, which does 
not fall within the categories of regime or public sphere 
is the level of economic performance, imperfectly meas-
ured by GDP. One might expect greater wealth to give 
a political system the resources for developing robust 
democratic institutions, in addition to giving citizens 
the required leisure for the kind of political engagement 
required for democratic accountability. One might also 
expect that the more resources at a government’s dis-
posal the greater would be the chances of it meeting the 
preferences of more citizens. Indeed, the fiscal ability 
of the government to meet the demands of conflicting 
identities, even in ethnically divided societies like Bel-
gium, has been given as an important reason for politi-
cal stability (Hooghe, 2003). 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY: USING VAA DATA 
TO MEASURE PARTY-VOTER PROXIMITY IN THE 
POLITICAL SPACE
In this paper, we measure the political space, and 
hence its inherent representative deficit, in 27 differ-
ent EU member states1, using data drawn from the EU 
Profiler and euandi. Although different in some respects, 
VAAs share a common underlying principle: they help 
users in their act of making a party choice and casting 
a vote by comparing their policy preferences on major 
issues with the programmatic stances of political parties 
on the same issues (for a review, see: Garzia and Mar-
schall, 2016; 2019). The core of every VAA that enables 
this comparison is a list of political issue statements for-
mulated by the body that created the VAA, e.g., “social 
programs should be maintained even at the cost of high-
er taxes”.2 Each user can express her degree of agreement 
or disagreement with each particular statement (see Fig-
ure 1, left). The resulting issue preferences of the user are 
then matched with the positions of the parties included 
in the VAA on these same issues (only parties already 
represented in parliament or with a reasonable chance 
to achieve representation in the election under analysis 
have been included in the VAA system). After compar-
ing the user’s profile with that of each party, the applica-
1 For reason of longitudinal comparability, we decided to exclude Croa-
tia from the sample insofar as this country only took part in EP elec-
tions in 2014.
2 For the selection of the 28 statements included in both VAAs, party 
manifestos were analysed to understand not only how frequently certain 
policy areas were mentioned, but also the ‘urgency’ with which parties 
discussed individual issues. At the same time, opinion polls, earlier 
party manifesto coding, groups of experts, academics and journalists 
were consulted for what they considered to be the key issues in the 
election. The various lists were then analysed together and the issues 
that occurred most frequently and urgently were selected for inclusion.
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tion produces a “voting advice”, usually in the form of 
a rank-ordered list, at the top of which stands the par-
ty closest to the user’s policy preferences (see Figure 1, 
right)3.
The concept of “representative deficit” was first 
derived and empirically measured by Alvarez et al. 
(2014: 239). In analogy to the work of these authors, 
we calculate the representative deficit by looking at the 
extent to which each individual matches up to all other 
political parties in the national space, following a match-
ing rule developed by the EU Profiler itself. Each issue 
statement produces responses on a 5-point Likert scale, 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The distance 
from party to individual is measured using this scale. 
The representative deficit variable ranges thus from 0 
to 100 percent and corresponds to the distance between 
a potential perfect overlap of 100 percent and the real 
extent of overlap between the best-matching party “on 
offer” and the user’s preferences, as shown to the user 
in the match-list visualization of the VAA. The smaller 
the representative deficit, therefore, the better the policy 
congruence between the best-matching party in a given 
voting space and a VAA user’s preferences.
The information produced by the VAA is useful to 
us in two major respects. First, with its numerous issue 
statements, it provides us with a measure of where par-
ties are located in a high-dimensional issue space. The 
methodology employed in both EU Profiler and euandi 
involved an iterative approach that integrates party self-
placement and expert assessment into the final position-
ing of political parties on the thirty political statements 
included in the VAAs (for a deeper discussion, see: Gar-
3 The matching algorithm of both VAAs is based on the city bloc 
method. For a better description of the calculation of user-party 
overlaps, see: www.euprofiler.eu and www.euandi.eu
zia et al., 2015). The information produced by these VAA 
projects is also useful insofar as it allows a straightfor-
ward comparison between the parties’ location in the 
policy space and that of a large array of users/voters. 
Traditional analyses of the ideological positions of the 
general population commonly resort to traditional sur-
veys. Nonetheless, VAAs would seem to feature a num-
ber of advantages vìs-a-vìs more traditional research 
tools. For one thing, VAAs are able to measure users’ 
position over a much larger set of policy issues as com-
pared to more “traditional” representative samples such 
as national election studies. Even more importantly, they 
allow comparisons of the issue positions of parties and 
voters using the same data source. In turn, this can help 
assessing our research questions by means of a straight-
forward measurement of the extent to which parties and 
voters are mutually congruent.4 
By way of illustration, Figures 2 and 3 below visu-
alize the state of political space in the United Kingdom 
and France respectively. These figures simplify the vari-
ous questions asked into two axes, namely, a left/right 
dimension and a pro/anti EU dimension. The density 
plot shows the location of individuals in our sample, 
with smaller concentric circles indicating concentrations 
of people.
4 Note, however, that one of the major problems linked to VAA research 
in this field is, for evident reasons, the highly non-representativeness of 
VAA usage. The problem of self-selection into the sample, which results 
in its non-representativeness, can be possibly mitigated in the light of 
Almond’s seminal distinction between the general public, the attentive 
public (which largely informs the general public by osmosis) and the 
elite public (e.g., politicians, high level civil servants). In a sense, VAA 
samples primarily come from the attentive public of each European 
country (see: Marschall, 2014). Under the assumption that it is the 
attentive public that informs the general public, then VAA samples 
may be thought to serve as the next best gauge of public opinion than a 
random sample of the general public itself.
Fig. 1. Example of a VAA statement (L); the ‘voting advice’ provided in the results screen (R). Source: www.euprofiler.eu.
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The plot for the UK shows two poles, one slightly to 
the left of centre and slightly more pro-European, and 
one slightly to the right of centre and strongly anti-Euro-
pean. The distribution of parties around these poles is 
intriguing: while all lie within the outermost line of the 
density plot, only the British National Party really emerg-
es as close to one of the two poles. The plot for France 
shows only one pole, by contrast, further to the left and 
more pro-European than the UK. Again, interestingly, 
few parties are anywhere near the centre of this pole, 
with many lying outside the political space implied by 
citizens altogether. These plots highlight clearly therefore 
that the overlap between citizens preferences and politi-
cal parties is far from perfect, and that the distribution of 
citizens and parties in political space is complex.
THE REPRESENTATIVE DEFICIT ACROSS DIFFERENT 
PARTY SYSTEMS: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The mean value of the national representative def-
icit for the whole sample of EU Profiler users in 2009 
is 28.2 per cent (N = 473,045) – that is, on average, 
users’ best matching party in their national constitu-
ency leaves about a quarter of their political preferenc-
es unrepresented. The figure for euandi users in 2014 
is slightly higher (M = 32.4; N = 399,882). In Table 1 
we present the average value of EU Profiler and euandi 
users’ representative deficit broken down by their coun-
try of residence.5 
Table 1 shows some interesting descriptive findings 
which are worth commenting on briefly. There are gen-
eral signs of a worsening of deficits between the 2009 
and 2014 rounds, which supports the general thesis that 
democratic representation is getting worse in Europe. 
There is also a clear, systematic difference between West-
ern and Eastern Europe, with Eastern European coun-
tries having comparatively higher deficits.
These findings complement those of Beate Sissenich 
(2010: 12), who believes that the nascent and fragile 
accountability mechanisms in Eastern European coun-
tries were set back by the EU’s insistence that acceding 
member states from Eastern Europe transpose commu-
nity law into national law by streamlining the domestic 
legislative process (Rose-Ackerman, 2007). 
The difference between East and Western Europe 
exists in both 2009 and 2014, though is narrower in 
2014. This narrowing can largely be explained by dis-
proportionately large increases in deficit for Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Malta and Portugal. While 
we do not have a systematic explanation which links all 
of these countries, it is interesting to note the presence 
5 Note that these figures are calculated based on the resulting proximity 
score between users and the best matching party based on the 17 
common statements included in both EU Profiler and euandi.
Fig. 2. The Political Space in the UK.
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of Cyprus, Greece and Portugal in this list, as they are 
three of the countries who were hardest hit by the Euro-
pean debt crisis, and who had to give up some of their 
fiscal sovereignty. Ireland and Spain, the other coun-
tries in this category, also experienced increases in rep-
resentative deficit above the Western European average 
increase. This offers some support for the idea that loss 
of sovereignty in this way has served to worsen the qual-
ity of democratic representation in these countries – a 
thesis widely put forward over the last years in various 
sectors of the news media but not systematically argued 
for or empirically tested in academic research. 
We will now move on to a series of analytical models 
which seek to explain variation in representative deficit at 
the country level. On the basis of our theoretical review, 
we explore a number of variables which are potentially 
relevant. In the first block we include all variables related 
to the political and institutional features of the countries 
under analysis. Firstly, we code the proportionality of 
the voting system used in terms of the electoral thresh-
old to gain representation in the European Parliament 
for a party in a given country.6 We expect more competi-
6 Although all EU countries employ a proportional system of seat 
allocation in EP elections, it is worth highlighting that the ratio between 
the number of available seats per country and the nominal threshold 
can vary substantially (e.g., between 1 percent in the case of Germany 
tive systems (that is, systems with a lower effective elec-
toral threshold) to lead to lower degrees of representative 
deficit. We also look at the number of political parties, 
as measured by the number of relevant parties included 
in the EU Profiler and euandi VAAs (i.e., parties already 
represented in national and/or EP parliaments as well as 
parties bearing a reasonable chance to gain representa-
tion through that election) as an obvious factor which 
ought to reduce the extent to which representation is in 
deficit. We also control for the degree of institutionaliza-
tion of the party system (measured as the years since a 
given country became democratic), the extent of decen-
tralization (measured with a dummy coding ‘1’ all coun-
tries in which federal/regional decentralization govern-
ance practices are in place) and the electoral size of the 
country (measured through the number of seats available 
to that nation in the European Parliament).
The second block of variables includes those related 
to the public sphere. To this purpose, we resort to sum-
mary measures developed by Reporters Without Bor-
ders (World Press Freedom Index) and the World Bank 
(World Governance Indicators: Voice & Accountability). 
to 17 percent in the cases of Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg). For this 
reason, we make use of the effective electoral threshold as a way to 
measure the proportionality of each nation’s electoral system. 
Fig. 3. The Political Space in France.
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Although there are other international databases meas-
uring the quality of the public sphere, the chosen data-
bases are best suited for relating to our VAA data. Not 
only do World Press Freedom and Voice & Account-
ability indices provide observations for all 27 countries 
profiled in by the selected VAAs, they are also annually 
constructed databases, thereby allowing us find match-
ing years with our VAA data so that we may carry out 
longitudinal analysis.7 Note that higher values of the 
7 For both elections, we resort to the values of the indices relative to 
World Press Freedom Index corresponds with less press 
freedom, whereas higher values of the Voice & Account-
ability index corresponds with a comparatively more dis-
cursively open and accountable political system. Finally, 
turnout is measured through the percentage of eligible 
voters casting their ballot in the EP elections of 2009 
and 2014 respectively. The analysis also includes coun-
tries’ GDP per capita (as provided by the World Bank) as 
a statistical control for potential effects of the economic 
conditions across the financial crisis. Descriptive statis-
tics for all variables included in the statistical analyses 
are presented in Table 2.
Before presenting the results of our analyses, it is 
worth commenting briefly on the modelling strategy 
employed. As discussed above, there are a wide variety 
of factors which are theoretically important when con-
sidering representative deficit. This suggests an analyti-
cal model which contains multiple independent vari-
ables. However the number of observations (27 countries 
observed in both 2009 and 2014) is very low for esti-
mating such a model. Furthermore, the multiplicity of 
potential independent variables increases the chances of 
committing a Type I error simply through testing multi-
ple potential combinations. 
Given this situation, we have adopted a three 
pronged strategy. First, we estimate univariate OLS 
regressions for each variable of interest for both 2009 
and 2014 waves, to establish if there is a statistically sig-
nificant correlation between the variable in question and 
representative deficit. These single regressions are rea-
sonable in terms of statistical power, and the opportuni-
ty to run the same test in both 2009 and 2014 enhances 
confidence in the results and makes Type I errors less 
likely. Second, we estimate a full model including all 
relevant variables, again for the 2009 and 2014 waves. 
These full models allow us to see which variables, if any, 
remain significant once all potential factors are taken 
into account.8 Finally, we estimate a first difference mod-
el, which looks at the extent to which changes in inde-
pendent variables correlate with changes in dependent 
variables. Again, this provides a further check for the 
results, decreasing the possibility of Type I errors. Our 
simple univariate and combined multivariate models are 
presented in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. 
A number of findings stand out from these tables. 
Univariate relationships between our independent vari-
the respective previous year (i.e., 2008 and 2013) in order to exclude 
potential intervening effects of the election itself on experts’ assessment.
8 Inclusion of all variables in a multivariate model is justified by the lack 
of significant collinearity: correlations between independent variables 
are all below 0.6, with the sole exception of Voice & Accountability and 
Years of Democracy in both 2009 (r=.84) and 2014 (r=.78).
Tab. 1. Average Representative Deficit by Country.
2009 2014 ∆2014-2009
Western Europe
Austria 27,01 25,84 -1,17
Belgium 21,14 23,68 +2,54
Cyprus 26,94 43,91 +16,97
Denmark 22,94 32,26 +9,32
Finland 23,98 32,37 +8,39
France 24,28 27,26 +2,98
Germany 26,82 27,14 +0,32
Greece 26,97 35,87 +8,90
Ireland 32,33 37,98 +5,65
Italy 25,85 31,76 +5,91
Luxembourg 24,68 28,47 +3,79
Malta 28,78 36,36 +7,58
Netherlands 19,66 22,37 +2,71
Portugal 29,22 37,53 +8,31
Spain 21,93 27,4 +5,47
Sweden 26,44 28,51 +2,07
United Kingdom 24,39 26,66 +2,27
MEAN WE 25,49 30,90 +5,41
Central and Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 25,53 44,18 +18,65
Czech Republic 27,01 31,60 +4,59
Estonia 27,11 24,95 -2,16
Hungary 28,87 35,12 +6,25
Latvia 42,28 29,30 -12,98
Lithuania 38,37 38,00 +0,37
Poland 38,42 34,62 -3,8
Romania 36,79 43,41 +6,62
Slovakia 34,56 40,09 +5,53
Slovenia 28,84 27,04 -1,8
MEAN CEE 32,78 34,83 +2,13
MEAN EU27 28,19 32,38 +4,19
Note: Cell entries are mean values of users’ representative deficit by 
national voting district (i.e., country of residence). 
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ables and the representative deficit goes by and large in 
the expected direction. Countries with lower electoral 
thresholds and a comparatively higher number of rel-
evant parties experience lower degrees of representative 
deficit (although the regression coefficients fall short of 
conventional levels of statistical significance in 2014). 
The number of years spent as a democracy also appears 
strongly related to lower representative deficit in 2009 
and 2014, though the effect decreases in 2014 (this might 
be expected as the relative importance of the difference 
in years as a democracy should decrease as time goes 
by). Decentralisation is a significant predictor of lower 
degrees of representative deficit in both election years 
as well. No statistical association would seem to appear 
between representative deficit and the electoral size of 
the country. 
Moving to variables more directly relating to the 
public sphere, we can see that voice and accountability 
has an especially impressive correlation with the repre-
sentative deficit. In every case the relationship is highly 
significant (in spite of the extremely low number of 
observations) and signed as expected. Higher degrees of 
press freedom would also seem to correlate negatively 
with the extent of of representative deficit, though the 
relationship is statistically significant only in 2014. As 
expected turnout rates in EP elections correlate posi-
tively with lower degrees of the representative deficit, 
but the coefficient is statistically significant only in 2009. 
Tab. 2. Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis.
2009 Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
Dependent Variable
Representative Deficit 28.19 5.60 19.66 42.28 27
Institutions
Electoral Threshold (%) 2.29 2.35 0.00 5.00 27
Number of Parties 8.96 2.78 4.00 16.00 27
Number of Seats in EP 29.07 26.38 5.00 99.00 27
Decentralization (dummy) 0.30 0.47 0.00 1.00 27
Years of Democratic Rule (1945=0) 42.59 21.02 16.00 64.00 27
Public Sphere
World Press Freedom Index (2008) 5.09 2.80 1.50 12.50 27
Voice and Accountability (2008) 1.15 0.30 0.51 1.60 27
Turnout in EP elections (%) 46.16 18.91 19.60 90.80 27
Controls
GDP per capita (in Euro) 32603 20592 6738 100735 27
2014 Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
Dependent Variable
Representative Deficit 32.36 6.32 22.37 44.18 27
Institutions
Electoral Threshold (%) 2.10 2.32 0.00 5.00 27
Number of Parties 8.70 2.57 3.00 13.00 27
Number of Seats in EP 27.41 25.21 6.00 96.00 27
Decentralization (dummy) 0.30 0.47 0.00 1.00 27
Years of Democratic Rule (1945=0) 47.59 21.02 21.00 69.00 27
Public Sphere
World Press Freedom Index (2013) 16.59 7.33 6.38 28.58 27
Voice and Accountability (2013) 1.10 0.38 0.29 1.68 27
Turnout in EP elections (%) 44.01 18.49 13.05 90.40 27
Controls
GDP per capita (in Euro) 34754 22283 7713 110665 27
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Finally, our GDP per capita measure shows that there is 
a strong relationship with the dependent variable, with 
richer countries reporting systematically lower values of 
the representative deficit.
In terms of the full model, there are fewer statisti-
cally significant results. Loss of statistical significance is 
especially pronounced in the case of institutional-level 
variables. After controlling for all other variables, only 
the decentralization variable is significant in both years, 
while electoral threshold remains within conventional 
levels of statistical significance only in 2009 and years of 
democratic rule only in 2014. 
Moving to public sphere variables, the multivari-
ate analysis confirms the strong impact of the Voice & 
Accountability index. Press freedom also emerges as sta-
tistically significant in both models, but counter to our 
expectations and preliminary results: once all other fac-
tors are taken into account, higher press freedom would 
seem to result in comparatively higher degrees of repre-
sentative deficit. Finally, the effect of electoral turnout 
seems to vanish along with that of GDP per capita. We 
would hence conclude that our data offers stronger sup-
port for the influence of the public sphere on the qual-
ity of representation, when compared to those variables 
related to the arrangement of the regime. 
To test the robustness of these results and to dig 
deeper into causality, we estimated one First Difference 
(FD) model aimed at explaining across-time changes of 
Tab. 3. Univariate OLS regression estimates.
2009 b S.E. P>|t| 
Institutions
Electoral Threshold 1.33 0.39 0.002
Number of Parties -0.81 0.37 0.038
Number of Seats in EP -0.04 0.04 0.376
Decentralization -4.89 2.20 0.036
Years of Democratic Rule -0.16 0.04 0.001
Public Sphere
World Press Freedom Index 0.06 0.40 0.887
Voice and Accountability -11.48 2.88 0.001
Turnout in EP elections -0.11 0.05 0.052
Controls
GDP per capita (in Euro*1000) -0.15 0.05 0.002
2014 b S.E. P>|t| 
Institutions
Electoral Threshold 0.64 0.53 0.236
Number of Parties -0.67 0.47 0.172
Number of Seats in EP -0.07 0.05 0.155
Decentralization -5.65 2.47 0.031
Years of Democratic Rule -0.13 0.05 0.028
Public Sphere
World Press Freedom Index 0.30 0.16 0.080
Voice and Accountability -10.36 2.64 0.001
Turnout in EP elections -0.07 0.07 0.287
Controls
GDP per capita (in Euro*1000) -0.14 0.05 0.011
Note: Dependent variable: Representative Deficit at country level.
Tab. 4. Multivariate analysis, OLS estimates.
2009 B S.E. t P>|t| 
Institutions
Electoral Threshold 0.91 0.43 2.11 0.050
Number of Parties 0.02 0.34 0.04 0.965
Number of Seats in EP 0.01 0.04 0.28 0.780
Decentralization -4.13 1.90 -2.18 0.044
Years of Democratic Rule 0.02 0.09 0.24 0.811
Public Sphere
World Press Freedom Index -0.93 0.43 -2.17 0.044
Voice and Accountability -12.48 7.35 -1.7 0.099
Turnout in EP elections -0.01 0.06 -0.18 0.856
Controls
GDP per capita (in 
1.000*Euro) -0.01 0.07 -0.16 0.878
Constant 45.80 8.96 5.11 0.000
R-Squared 0.74
2014 b S.E. t P>|t| 
Institutions
Electoral Threshold 0.35 0.46 0.76 0.457
Number of Parties -0.43 0.42 -1.04 0.314
Number of Seats in EP -0.03 0.06 -0.49 0.627
Decentralization -4.56 2.45 -1.86 0.080
Years of Democratic Rule 0.24 0.10 2.32 0.033
Public Sphere
World Press Freedom Index -0.48 0.28 -1.71 0.097
Voice and Accountability -21.35 6.21 -3.44 0.003
Turnout in EP elections 0.03 0.09 0.36 0.722
Controls
GDP per capita (in 
1.000*Euro) -0.09 0.09 -0.99 0.335
Constant 60.81 8.99 6.77 0.000
R-Squared 0.65
Note: Dependent variable: Representative Deficit at country level.
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mean representative deficit at the country level. The FD 
estimator is intended to wipe out time invariant omit-
ted variables using the repeated observations over time. 
In other words, estimation takes place by regressing 
“changes on changes” using OLS (Wooldridge, 2001). 
To put it more simply, changes in aggregate-level repre-
sentative deficit across the five years under analysis (i.e., 
say representative deficit in Italy equals ´25.9´ in 2009 
and ´31.8´ in 2014, the value of the dependent variable 
for Italy equals to ´5.9´) are explained as a function of 
across-wave changes (Δ) in the key independent varia-
bles included in the previous models. Note that the vari-
ables related to decentralization and the number of years 
under democratic rule are excluded from this analysis as 
no change could be witnessed across the two time points 
under analysis.
The results, as presented in Table 5, point in the 
same direction of the previous analyses, and further 
provide support for the idea that decreasing representa-
tive deficit in a given country is linked to higher voice 
and accountability. The result also seems to suggest that 
it is linked to comparatively lower press freedom. How-
ever, it is worth noting that the degree of press freedom 
in a given country is included in the voice and account-
ability index, which is an aggregate index of a wide vari-
ety of measures. Hence, in this model, press freedom 
acts as a kind of “correction” to the more general Voice 
& Accountability index, indicating that while increases 
in voice and accountability are generally positively cor-
related with decreases in representative deficit, increas-
es that relate specifically to press freedom have less of 
an impact. This is supported by the univariate models, 
which showed no statistically significant correlation 
between press freedom and representative deficit. 
CONCLUSION
This paper began with the contention that the 
degree of ideational congruence between citizens and 
their representatives constitutes the central normative 
problem of democracy. While this statement may be 
relatively uncontroversial, empirical studies have rarely 
given centre stage to the representative deficit. Perhaps 
this is in part due to the fact that databases document-
ing the quality of democracy across countries tend not 
to provide objective measures of this phenomenon. With 
the availability of international VAAs, such as those 
employed in this paper, we are in a position to provide 
relatively reliable measures of the representative deficit 
across countries and across time. This, in turn, puts us 
in a unique position to contribute towards an under-
standing of those factors that tend to impact the quality 
of ideational representation in the EU. 
Our descriptive statistics are interesting in them-
selves, corroborating widespread reports of a democratic 
decline in the Western world, as well as a notable gap 
in the quality of representation between Western and 
Eastern Europe. Interestingly, it was observed that those 
countries suffering from a loss of financial sovereignty 
in Europe had an above average worsening of their rep-
resentative deficit between 2009 and 2014. While we 
could not offer systematic evidence for the relationship 
between financial sovereignty and the representative def-
icit, it stands to reason that ideational congruence will 
suffer when the communicative conveyer belt between 
citizens and representatives is shut down on salient 
domains typically reserved for domestic government due 
to the intervention of international and supranational 
bodies. 
When it comes to determining those variables that 
most impact the representative deficit, we found contra-
ry to expectations that many of the institutional varia-
bles we explored do not have a substantial impact on the 
dependent variable. What did stand out as influential are 
factors more directly related to the public sphere, namely 
voice and accountability and press freedom. However, 
while the former clearly emerged as the most impor-
tant variable influencing the representative deficit, press 
freedom was found to be negatively correlated with the 
representative deficit. As said, there are methodological 
grounds to believe in the spuriousness of this correla-
Tab. 5. First-Difference Estimation (2014 – 2009).
b S.E. P>|t| 
Institutions
Electoral Threshold 0.43 0.95 0.652
Number of Parties 0.45 0.39 0.257
Number of Seats in EP 0.47 0.65 0.481
Public Sphere
World Press Freedom Index -0.51 0.22 0.031
Voice and Accountability -42.20 13.35 0.005
Turnout in EP elections 0.14 0.12 0.271
Controls
GDP per capita (in 
1.000*Euro) -0.08 0.33 0.811
Constant 9.63 2.70 0.002
R-Squared 0.49
Note: Dependent variable: Difference (2014-2009) in Representative 
Deficit at country level.
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tion. Nevertheless, our analyses would not seem to offer 
support for the hypothesis that increasing press freedom 
increases the quality of representation. 
A potential explanation for this unexpected relation-
ship between press freedom and representation can be 
found in the work of Bernard Manin (1997). On Manin’s 
view, press freedom is essential for a good democracy, yet 
the proliferation of media inevitably leads to a much wid-
er diversity of opinions than in a relatively unfree press 
environment. On this view it stands to reason that great-
er diversity of opinions, made possible by a free press, 
will make it more difficult for representatives to find ide-
ational congruence with their citizens in political space. 
The general lesson here is that, while representation may 
be at the heart of democracy, everything that is demo-
cratic will not necessarily improve ideational congruence.
To conclude, there are both unsurprising and sur-
prising findings in this paper. Somewhat unsurprising-
ly, we have found a decline in the representative deficit 
across Europe; a persistent difference between Western 
and Eastern Europe; and the importance of voice and 
accountability in determining the representative defi-
cit. More unexpected were our findings concerning the 
relative unimportance of institutional factors, electoral 
turnout and GDP for our dependent variable, as well as 
the relationship between press freedom and the repre-
sentative deficit. While we do not claim that ideational 
congruence between representatives and the represented 
is the only relevant factor for assessing a good democ-
racy, or even for evaluating good representation, what 
we do insist upon is the importance of such a measure 
to any research on the quality of democracy. This paper 
has been an attempt to advance research on this funda-
mental question within the European context in a cross-
national and longitudinal analysis. 
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